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n administrative law, specialized courts are a nostrum for occasional use
(prn).l They offer important institutional advantages, yet at a price that
has restricted their use. Their existence has owed more to history than to
any grand theory of government organization. Congress has created,
restructured, and abandoned particular courts, sometimes seeming merely
to tinker with them. They have coexisted with generalist courts that decide
many issues which appear to be equally good-or bad-candidates for
separate treatment.
Today, caseload pressures on the federal courts have led to renewed inter-
est in creating or expanding specialized courts to relieve the crush.2 Since
institutional change should pursue principle as well as expediency, I write
to offer considerations bearing on the use of these courts in administrative
law, and to suggest creation of a new administrative court with jurisdiction
over cases meeting certain criteria.
All three constitutional branches have performed specialized adjudica-
tion, in ways that present only subtle functional distinctions. Our govern-
ment includes Article I legislative courts, Article II executive adjudicators,
and Article III judges with specialized dockets. Although no very clear nor-
mative or constitutional theory has emerged to limit congressional alloca-
tions of business among these entities, courts and commentators do display
concerns that guide prescriptive analysis. A rough consensus exists that some
issues should remain in generalized federal courts, and that others rest com-
fortably in specialized fora.
My goal here is to unravel the rather tangled history of specialized adju-
*John S. Redditt Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin. This article was also
a report to the Administrative Conference of the United States. I thank the Conference and
its able staff for their assistance, but they are not responsible for the views expressed herein.
'1 review below the history of the specialized courts that have special significance for
administrative review. There are others, for example Bankruptcy Courts, the Court of Mil-
itary Appeals, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and the Special Court, Regional
Rail Reorganization Act of 1973.
2See, e.g., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE (1990); AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS, THE UNITED
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS: REEXAMINING STRUCTURE AND PROCESS AFTER A CENTURY
OF GROWTH (1989).
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dication enough to identify the programs where it seems most usefully
employed, and to offer some principles for its architecture. After a quick
review of general considerations bearing on specialized courts, I canvass
their history to date. The historical record is mixed enough to induce con-
sideration of the merits of varying degrees of independence for adjudicators
both inside and outside agencies. Some notes on identifiable constitutional
considerations then precede conclusions regarding the best uses of special-
ized courts in modern administrative law.
I. THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF SPECIALIZED COURTS
The general benefits and costs of specialized courts are well known.3 First,
they relieve the caseload burdens of other courts, perhaps substantially.
Gauging docket relief is not, however, a matter of simply counting filings
shifted from one court to another. What matters is the amount of time and
effort spared the judges. The federal judiciary has compensated for case-
loads that rise faster than new judgeships by deciding many cases in a more
summary manner (for example without argument or opinion) and by dele-
gating many tasks to law clerks and other support personnel, whose numbers
have multiplied. 4 Cases that now occupy the summary docket do not nec-
essarily deserve such treatment-they yield to cases placing higher claims
on the judges' time. Victims of this process of triage could receive more
attention in alternate fora, while somewhat relieving the strain on the most
overloaded part of the system. And some business that now receives the full
attention of federal judges could be shunted elsewhere, for maximum case-
load relief. Yet caution is necessary-devotion of scarce resources to exist-
ing cases implies their importance. So the trick is to find the cases that
impose the greatest burdens on the courts compared to their importance.
Second, specialized judges can become expert in the substantive and pro-
cedural issues surrounding particular programs, especially highly technical
ones. More accurate decisions should result. Expertise can take several forms.
Some subjects draw on extralegal training, for example the use of engi-
neering and science in patents or environmental law. Much of this sort of
expertise relates to issues of fact and policy. Although it would not be effi-
cient for generalized courts to emphasize expensive training in the back-
ground of their judges or staff, the opposite may be true of specialized
courts. Legal expertise, as in tax, may depend on long study of a complex
body of law. Here also, a generalized court may waste knowledge that a
specialized one could seek-or could develop through exposure to its docket.
3The considerations that I outline in this section are discussed in Dreyfuss, Specialized
Adjudication, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 377, 377-82; Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Adminis-
trative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1116-21 (1990);Jordan, Specialized Courts:
A Choice?, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 745, 747-48 (1981); Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of
Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 62-74 (1975).4 R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS, CRISIS AND REFORM ch. 4 (1985).
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Third, division of labor promotes efficiency. Due to expertise and a lim-
ited caseload, specialized courts can produce expeditious decisions. The
number of judges can be adjusted to the historical caseload. There is, how-
ever, some special vulnerability to exogenous factors affecting the under-
lying controversies. For example, the number of social security disability
cases rose sharply in the early 1980s, and then receded.
5
Finally, specialized courts reduce or eliminate intercourt conflicts, pro-
moting a uniform national body of law. A pattern of conflicting court orders,
uncertainty about the law, and forum shopping has traditionally led to the
establishment of specialized courts. This advantage has special importance
now that caseloads have effectively decentralized the federal courts by
removing the likelihood of Supreme Court review of most courts of appeals
decisions. 6 A single, specialized court can articulate a unitary body of law in
a way that thirteen courts of appeals cannot approach.
A primary cost of specialization is loss of the generalist perspective. A
premise of our nation's usual resort to courts of general jurisdiction is that
sound decisionmaking results from exposure to a wide range of problems,
rather than from initiation into an arcane set of mysteries. Generalization
has two related benefits. Some loosely related legal issues may produce direct
cross-fertilization of insights. More often, a wider perspective aidsjudgment
by forestalling the exaggerated importance that long immersion may lend
to some social problem. A broadened perspective may be especially impor-
tant in those who review the action of bureaucracies that are themselves
narrowly focused.
Also, specialization may diminish the prestige of a court. It will be staffed
by lower-caliber judges, those who can tolerate life on the assembly line.
Loss of prestige can fundamentally impair a court's power. Part of a court's
success in obtaining compliance with its mandates flows from the respect
others have for it. Depending on the subject matter that is segregated, there
is also a risk of impairing the remaining generalist courts by leaving them
with less interesting fare.
Specialization can produce bias problems, in two ways. First, the appoint-
ments process may be distorted as nominees are selected and confirmed for
their views on specific issues. Pressure on the appointing authority flows
from two sources. Interest groups affected by a court's decisions have a
strong incentive to advance their allies. Yet groups vary in their intrinsic
cohesion and their ability to overcome free rider effects to achieve effective
organization. Government programs that affect relatively diffuse and dis-
organized segments of the public, for example some benefits programs, may
not encounter forceful interest group response, although segments of the
5Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six: or, The Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days,
1988 Wis. L. REv. 921, 929-31.
6See Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1987).
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bar that serve such groups can sometimes act as surrogates.7 Agencies
reviewed by a court will always take an active interest in appointments to it.
They will discover insight and eminence in their own alumni.
Even if initially disinclined to press for favorable appointments, both
interest groups and agencies may feel a need to offset the activities of the
other. To be sure, the net effect of the process may be to cancel out these
interested influences, although it takes some faith to believe that will occur.
In any event, the pool of eligible candidates may consist of former agency
staff and a specialized segment of the bar. To the extent that qualifications
for the court converge with those for the principal executive positions in
the agency reviewed, excessive convergence of perspective in agency and
court may also occur. These problems of litmus tests and limited pools do
not usually confront generalist courts.
Second, specialization can distort application of the review standard.
Growing expertise may lead courts to substitute theirjudgment for an agency,
creating an overly dominant oversight body. On the other hand, such a
court can become too friendly with an agency that it reviews regularly, or
with interests that dominate it. Those who litigate repeatedly before a par-
ticular court possess natural advantages over occasional participants., Again,
these effects will not always counterbalance even when both agencies and
interest groups regularly appear. Moreover, it is difficult for outside mon-
itors in Congress or the public to identify distortions in the standard.
Although gross rates of reversal may be suggestive, the frame of reference
is suspect. For example, a high rate of reversal compared to generalist courts
with similar responsibilities (if there are any) may mean that review is too
stringent, or only that the agency is unusually inept.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SPECIALIZED COURTS
Specialized courts of past and present have manifested the foregoing
advantages and disadvantages, in a balance that lies in the eyes of the
observer. Obviously, the stakes are high. I review the history of these courts
briefly to identify lessons about their future prospects.
A. The Federal Circuit and Its Predecessors
In 1982, Congress formed the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC)9 by combining and rearranging courts whose long existence testifies
to some success. The evolution of these courts and the nature of their treat-
ment in 1982 reveal both the ad hoc approach of Congress to these issues
7M. OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS ch. 6 (1968).
8Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 97-104 (1974).
'Federal Courts Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). See generally Adams, The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit: More Than a National Patent Court, 49 Mo. L. REV. 43 (1984).
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and the inefficiencies that have sometimes resulted. In addition, the struc-
ture of the new CAFC provides a possible model for other specialized courts.
The CAFC took over some functions of our first permanent specialized
court, the Court of Claims, which was established in 1855 to relieve Con-
gress of the burden of deciding claims against the United States. ' 0 Although
Congress meant it to be an Article III court, the Supreme Court initially
refused to review its judgments because they were subject to administrative
review." The Court of Claims evolved into an appellate forum, reviewing
decisions of commissioners that it appointed. Its major responsibilities were
to adjudicate contract and other nontort claims under the Tucker Act.'
2
Congress folded its appellate functions into the new CAFC, and created a
new Article I trial court, the Claims Court.'
3
The most important element of the CAFC is the former Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (CCPA).' 4 It began as the Court of Customs Appeals in
1909. The court, created to relieve the dockets of the circuit courts of cus-
toms matters, heard appeals from a succession of customs adjudicators.'
5
The CCPA became an odd hybrid in 1929, when Congress responded to
longstanding calls for expertise and uniformity in patent matters by adding
jurisdiction over appeals from the Commissioner of Patents.' 6 A more pro-
saic purpose may account for passage of this legislation, however. Congress
10Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612; see generally 2 W. COWEN, P. NICHOLS &
M. BENNETT, THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS: A HISTORY (1978).
"Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864). Curative legislation then removed
the offending provision. Act of March 17, 1866, ch. 19, 14 Stat. 9.
'2Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505. It also had, however, some administrative
duties to report to Congress on private relief bills. In 1933, the Supreme Court once again
held the Court to be an Article I entity. Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933).
Eventually, Congress once again brought it back within Article III; Act ofJuly 28, 1953, 67
Stat. 226; see S. REP. No. 261, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). This time, the Supreme Court
acquiesced. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
'328 U.S.C. §§ 171-77 (1988). The Claims Court retains the duty to report to Congress
on private bills. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1492, 2509 (1988). Staffed by the commissioners of the defunct
Court of Claims, it rides circuit nationwide.
'4Act of August 5, 1909, § 29, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11, 105. My history of this court is drawn
from G. RICH, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CUSTOMS AND PATENT
APPEALS (1980); F. FRANKFURTER &J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 174-
84 (1928); H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 154-61 (1973); Nathan-
son, The Administrative Court Proposal, 57 VA. L. REV. 996, 1008-09 (1971).
'"These were: the old Board of General Appraisers, Act of June 10, 1890, Ch. 407, § 12,
26 Stat. 131, 137; an Article I Customs Court, Act of June 17, 1930, Ch. 497, § 518, 46
Stat. 590, 737; an Article III Customs Court, Act of July 14, 1956, ch. 589, 70 Stat. 532;
and the Article III Court of International Trade, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980).
The CIT was given broad jurisdiction over international trade matters in an effort to stem
jurisdictional confusion with the district courts. H. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-
19 (1980). See generally Cohen, The New United States Court of International Trade, 20 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 277 (1981). The CIT has been relatively free of controversy. Dreyfuss,
supra note 3, at 403.
'6Act of March 2, 1929, ch. 488, 45 Stat. 1475.
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transferred patent appeals from an overburdened D.C. Circuit to an unde-
rutilized group of customs judges. I7
Unhappily, creation of the CCPA did little to consolidate decision of pat-
ent law. Regional federal courts continued to hear many patent and trade-
mark infringement suits. Eminent federal judges complained that they did
not feel competent to decide patent litigation: "I am unable to perceive why
we should not insist on the same level of scientific understanding on the
patent bench that clients demand of the patent bar, or why lack of such
understanding by the judge should be deemed a precious asset."',,
In such a decentralized and inexpert system, intercircuit divergence was
considerable; forum shopping was rampant. 9 In addition, for two reasons
the generalist federal courts displayed an overall difference in outlook from
that of the CCPA. First, structural features of both the Patent and Trade-
mark Office (PTO) and the CCPA made them overly favorable to granting
patents. The problem was that the PTO heard ex parte applications for
patents, and the CCPA heard only appeals from denials. Second, for a time
the patent bar, which favors lenient patentability, held sway over appoint-
ments to the CCPA.20 The specialists in the PTO and the CCPA began
producing decisions at marked variance from those of the federal courts,
which accorded their decisions little respect.2 1
To correct the imbalance, Congress consolidated both patentability and
enforcement appeals in the CAFC by granting it jurisdiction over appeals
from the district courts as well as from the PTO. Hearing both sides of
patents controversies, the CAFC appears to have improved the state of the
law.2 2 The broadened perspective has allowed it to make a new tradeoff. It
supervises the PTO's grant of patents closely, but has strengthened the pre-
sumption of validity for patents once granted.23 The overall effect is to
increase the law's protection for patentees. Whether or not that is good
patent policy, the law is more unified and clear. Hence Congress is better
able to monitor and adjust patent law. A continuing disadvantage of this
scheme, however, is that many complicated fact issues, for which speciali-
zation would be helpful, are decided in the generalized district courts.2 4
In forming the CAFC, Congress sought to avoid overspecialization and
'7S. REP. No. 784, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928). After some early doubts, the CCPA was
held to be an Article III court. The doubts were due to dicta in Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279
U.S. 438 (1929). Congress legislated to clarify the court's status, Pub. L. No. 85-755, 72
Stat. 848 (1958). The Court agreed in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
18 H. FRIENDLY, supra note 14, at 157-58 (also reporting the views of Learned Hand).
19This paragraph reports conclusions of a study by Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case
Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989).20Baum,Judicial Specialization, Litigant Influence, and Substantive Policy: The Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, I I LAW & Soc'v REV. 823, 837-43 (1977).21The Supreme Court once remarked: "We have observed a notorious difference between
the standards applied by the Patent Office and by the courts." Graham v. John Deere Co.,
383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966).22Dreyfuss, supra note 19, at 74, so concludes.
231d. at 21-26.
24Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 411.
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capture by creating "a varied docket spanning a broad range of legal issues."2 5
In addition, the court must rotate its judges among panels, to ensure expo-
sure to the entire docket. 26 Along with patents and customs matters, the
CAFC hears appeals from the Claims Court, the Court of International
Trade, the International Trade Commission, the Merit Systems Protection
Board, and certain other agency and district court decisions .2 The court
has received mixed reviews for its performance of these other functions.2 8
There is also some nagging jurisdictional uncertainty, although Congress
tried to minimize it by assigning the court general review authority for par-
ticular trial fora and programs.
2 9
B. The Commerce Court
The "Banquo's ghost" at any discussion of specialized courts is the Com-
merce Court, which had a brief, unhappy life from 1910-13 .30 Citing needs
for expertise, expedition, and uniformity, President Taft proposed a court
to review decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Even as Con-
gress complied, however, charges emerged that the court would favor the
railroads.3' The court soon found itself in a political maelstrom, without
allies-not even the railroads, which were supposed to have captured it.
"[T]he Commerce Court entered an environment partial to the Commission
and distrustful of courts. With undoubted courage and disinterestedness the
Court, heedless of the public temper, promptly began to reverse the Com-
mission and to curb its activity. '32 Although comparison of the court's rever-
sal rate of ICC orders with those of other courts does not support charges
of capture by the railroads,23 perception carried the day, and the court passed
into history.
The history of the Commerce Court may have conveyed more lessons
than were in it. The court existed at a time when specialized judicial review,
the particular body of law to be administered, and even administrative reg-
15H. R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, 31 (1981).
2628 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1988).
1
7Adams, supra note 9, at 65-67.
28Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 404-06; see, e.g., Vaughn, Federal Employment Decisions of the
Federal Circuit, 35 AM. U.L. REv. 1037 (1986); Blatt, The Federal Circuit's 1985 Tax Cases:
The Exercise of Equity, 35 AM. U.L. REV. 1097 (1986).29Adams, supra note 9, at 68-75; Note, An Appraisal of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 301 (1984). For example, even the court's patents jurisdiction
remains somewhat incomplete and uncertain, because it does not decide issues arising as
defenses in district court. The CIT, which the CAFC reviews, also suffers jurisdictional
problems. Cohen, Recent Decisions of the Court of International Trade Relating to Jurisdiction: A
Primer and a Critique, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 700 (1984).
I0My history of the court is drawn from Dix, The Death of the Commerce Court: A Study in
Institutional Weakness, 8 AM.J. LEGAL Hisi. 238 (1964); F. FRANKFURTER &J. LANDIS, supra
note 14, at 153-74; Nathanson supra note 14, at 1004-08; the allusion is Judge Friendly's,
supra note 14, at 188.
'IS. REP. No. 355, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910).
32F. FRANKFURTER &J. LANDIS, supra note 14, at 165.
"Dix, supra note 30, at 246 (Commerce Court reversal rate of 41% for ICC; 69% in
circuit courts).
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ulation were new, evolving, and productive of widespread controversy. Nev-
ertheless, the enduring warning is that no specialized court should be created
to oversee a single agency that deals with a single powerful interest group.
Even if the court did not in fact favor the railroads, the speed with which it
lost public confidence is instructive. Indeed, had the court survived, the
railroads would have had every incentive to try to capture it.1
4
C. The Tax Court
The Tax Court is part of a complex structure for litigating federal tax
liability." It began in 1924 as the Board of Tax Appeals, an executive agency
designed to have some independence from the Treasury Department.16 In
1969, it took its present form as an Article I court, titled the United States
Tax Court.37 Repeated attempts to assure the independence of the court
have responded to its longstanding reputation as overstaffed with former
government lawyers and, hence, biased against the taxpayer.
3 8
A disgruntled taxpayer can resort to any of three trial fora: the specialized
Tax Court, the semispecialized Claims Court, or the generalized district
court.3 9 All three sit nationwide. The district courts and the Tax Court are
reviewed in the regional courts of appeals; the Claims Court in the CAFC.
The result is a highly decentralized system ofjudicial review. Commentators
have heaped abuse on it for many years, with perfect logic and little effect.
40
Not surprisingly, the Internal Revenue Service has long refused to acquiesce
in the orders of particular courts of appeals as determining how it should
administer its programs nationally.4' The Tax Court once did so as well,
but it now follows precedent of the circuit to which appeal lies from a
decision.
42
It seems unlikely that the Tax Court is progovernment today. The gov-
ernment's gross recovery rate is about one-third of deficiencies claimed.
4
3 1n 1894, Attorney General Olney cynically predicted that the ICC could be "of great
use to the railroads" if it satisfied popular desire for regulation but was lax in enforcement.
He noted that "the older such a commission gets to be, the more inclined it will be found
to take the business and railroad view of things." Quoted in M. JOSEPHSON, THE POLITICOS
526 (1938). Similar hopes or fears could well have been entertained for the court.35See generally Jordan, supra note 3, at 749-54. For its history, see H. DUBROFF, THE
UNITED STATES TAX COURT (1979).
36Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900, 43 Stat. 253, 336. In 1942, it was renamed the
Tax Court of the United States and its members were styled judges. Revenue Act of 1942,
ch. 619, § 504, 56 Stat. 798, 957.
17Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 730 (1969).
"8 See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 14, at 166, reporting this perception.
-9Kramer,jurisdiction Over Civil Tax Cases, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 444.
4°See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 14, at 161-71 (reviewing the literature and proposing a
Court of Tax Appeals).
4'Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679,
713-14 (1989).
4'Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 756-58, (1970), affd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
4
UNITED STATES TAX COURT, ANN. REP. 11 (1988).
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Moreover, the court hears over 90% of the tax cases. 44 Since litigants have
the option of avoiding the court if they distrust it, its substantial caseload
supports its neutrality. 45 Indeed, the third of the Claims Court docket that
consists of tax cases probably reflects taxpayers avoiding adverse precedent
in their home circuit, in favor of the CAFC. 46 Any taxpayer victory there
can create national precedent, as later cases flow to Claims Court.
47
Tax appeals are not welcomed in the generalist appellate courts. The
complexity of the code has for many years daunted federaljudges. (Learned
Hand lamented that "the words. . . merely dance before my eyes in a mean-
ingless procession. 48 1) As a result, the courts of appeals defer heavily to the
Tax Court, notwithstanding congressional efforts to stop the practice. 4
9
The specialist approach is equally suited to tax law at both the trial and
the appellate level. 50 The intellectual challenge of tax law should benefit a
specialized court by attracting able judges. Also, the breadth of the code's
impact on society tends to widen the view of the specialist and to cancel out
particular interests in the appointment process.
5
1
D. The Emergency Court of Appeals and the Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals
Like the "temporary" wartime buildings that long graced the Washington
Mall, 52 emergency appellate courts have demonstrated their capacity to out-
last the crisis that precipitated them. The Emergency Court of Appeals (ECA)
was created to exercise exclusive jurisdiction (subject to Supreme Court
review) of challenges to price and rent regulations in the era of World War
11.53 Persons aggrieved by actions of the price administrator were required
to appeal to the special court or forego review, even in defense of criminal
proceedings.54 Staffed by federal judges designated by the ChiefJustice, the
court sat in panels throughout the nation. Since regulations remained in
effect during the pendency of review, speed and uniformity of result were
imperative to the success of the control programs; and so was public confi-
44Special Project, An Empirical Study of Intercircuit Conflicts on Federal Income Tax Issues, 9
VA. TAX REV. 125, 125 n.1 (1989).
"5There is a cost to the alternate fora, though. The taxpayer must pay the tax and seek
a refund.
46Adams, supra note 9, at 77.
47Special Project, supra note 44, at 130.
4"Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947).
4Special Project, supra note 44, at 132 & n.36, 141 (Tax Court affirmance rate 75%;
District Court, 60%).
"0Kramer, supra note 39, at 449-51.
5 Jordan, supra note 3, at 750-5 1.
52For a description, see D. BRINKLEY, WASHINGTON GOES TO WAR 119-20 (1988).
"Act of January 30, 1942, ch. 26, § 204, 56 Stat. 31; see generally Dreyfuss, supra note
3, at 393-96; Nathanson, The Emergency Court of Appeals, in OFFICE OF PRICE ADMINISTRA-
TION, PROBLEMS IN PRICE CONTROL: LEGAL PHASES 1 (1947).
4Nathanson, The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942: Administrative Procedure and Judicial
Review, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 60, 69-76 (1942). The constitutionality of the scheme
was upheld in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
SUMMER 1991
43 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 329
dence in the fairness of administration, because national economic controls
cannot succeed without extensive voluntary compliance.
Although the court dealt with a single agency, its programs touched every
aspect of society and probably benefited from wartime solidarity.5 5 Overall,
the court succeeded admirably, sustaining the administrator most of the
time but giving complainants enough victories to avoid serious charges of
bias. 56 Indeed, Congress kept the court in existence to review various post-
war and Korean War control programs; it finally disbanded in 1961.57
When economic controls resurfaced in the early 1970s, Congress created
a similar court that still exists, the Temporary [sic] Emergency Court of
Appeals (TECA).55 Unlike its predecessor, TECA reviews the district courts;
there is also some state court litigation. 59 As general economic controls with-
ered in 1973, the energy crisis arose and TECA took on its current assign-
ment as a reviewer of energy programs.60 Congress did not pause to consider
whether TECA's structure, which preserved access to district courts for the
many small businesses affected by national controls, was best suited to a long-
term program regulating a single major industry. 6' Moreover, Congress left
in place some truncated procedures for agency action that may have fitted
an initial crisis, but caused sharp criticism of the fairness of agency action
over the long run. 62 Judicial review risked being both ineffective and dupli-
cative at the same time, because review on a questionable administrative
record in the district courts was followed by appeal of right to the courts of
appeals.
63
Not surprisingly, TECA has received more negative reviews than its pre-
decessor. In contrast to the old Commerce Court, which also reviewed sin-
gle-industry regulation, TECA has been charged with favoring the agency.
64
Perceptions arose that TECA became "caught up in the agency's mission as
its reason for being, '65 in a fundamental confusion of roles. This charge is
hard to evaluate, though, because it mimics a more benign influence-the
"5Courts reviewing various aspects of its performance invoked the war powers. Spreecher,
Price Control in the Courts, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 34, 40-42 (1944).
56See Nathanson, supra note 14, at 1009-12.
57Transcript of Proceedings of the Final Session of the United States Emergency Court
of Appeals, 299 F.2d 1 (1961).
"8Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 21 l(b) (1), 85
Stat. 743, 749.
59See Jordan, supra note 3, at 759-62.
6°Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, § 5, 87 Stat. 627,
633; Emergency Natural Gas Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-2, § 10(b), 91 Stat. 4, 9.
61See generally Aman, Institutionalizing the Energy Crisis: Some Structural and Procedural
Lessons, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 491 (1980).
62These programs were exempted from the adjudicative requirements of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. Id. at 496-97, 527-28, 532-36, 571-72; Elkins, The Temporary Emer-
gency Court of Appeals: A Study in the Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 1978 DUKE L.J. 113,
132-36.
61Aman, supra note 61, at 563-71.
64Elkins, supra note 62.
65Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509,
515 (1974).
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court's awareness of the difficulty of administering highly complex energy
programs and a consequent stance of deference. 66 Perhaps such a stance is
natural to generalist judges who have enough exposure to particular spe-
cialist programs to form some sympathy with those who must administer
them.
Because its power is limited to issues arising under particular statutes,
TECA has also suffered jurisdictional difficulties. 67 Litigants and the court
devote substantial resources to deciding jurisdictional issues. Since TECA
issues often accompany unrelated ones, bifurcation of appeals is frequent,
and sometimes appeal rights evaporate entirely.
68
E. Lessons Learned
Some guidelines for constructing specialized courts emerge from this
overview. First, to minimize jurisdictional uncertainty and litigation, subject
matter should be chosen for its segregability from other claims. For exam-
ple, tax issues usually do not accompany others; energy issues eligible for
TECA often do. To avoid bifurcating appeals, litigation should be shunted
to the specialized court in its entirety (as occurs with the CAFC)69 or left in
the generalist courts. Too many forum-shopping opportunities attend cre-
ation of a new court with jurisdiction over only a portion of an integrated
subject matter, such as the old CCPA or the Tax Court. Why endure the
general disadvantages of specialization while forfeiting the primary benefit
of unification of the law?
Second, the nature of a court's docket should expose the judges to both
sides of pertinent controversies, instead of a set of appeals presenting skewed
arguments, as in the CCPA. The CAFC, with a wider jurisdiction, sees a
full range of related problems in patent law, and must directly balance inter-
ests in invention and competition. Also, the consolidation of the cases gives
the new court adequate remedial scope to adjust the body of law it
administers.
Third, allocations of subject matter should avoid combining generalists
and specialists in ways that erode gains from specialization. It makes little
sense to have the specialist trial forum of the Tax Court reviewed in the
generalist courts of appeals. 70 Similarly, difficulties that the generalist dis-
trict courts have with patents litigation cannot all be cured by the CAFC,
operating under the constraints of appellate review.7
66See Jordan, supra note 3, at 760-61. Another explanation is that both agency and court
needed a shakedown period, after which the review relationship is no longer a very distinctive
one. Id. at 761-62.
67Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 398, 412.
68
Note, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, 64 MINN. L.
REV. 1247, 1256-57 (1980).
69The CAFC applies the law of the circuit from which a case comes to nonpatent issues
found in cases within its jurisdiction. Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 413.
7°See generally Kramer, supra note 39.
7 Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 411-12.
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Fourth, each stage of judicial review should serve a distinctive function
that is best performed by the court employed. Repetitive appellate review
in different courts under TECA wastes resources. True, district courts are
best able to supplement thin agency records, which have been a problem
for TECA, but an obvious cure for that is to provide for adequate admin-
istrative process in the first place and to go directly to a court of appeals,
with its greater familiarity with substantive issues in administrative
programs.
7"
Direct appellate review of final orders suits adjudications involving large
amounts in controversy, as in TECA and in many trade, labor, and securities
programs. Since high stakes encourage the pursuit of all available appeals,
initial district court review becomes duplicative. Moreover, the requirement
of exhausting administrative remedies before seeking review allows the
agency to perform the winnowing function of the district courts.7" Efficiency
is promoted, because agencies have more latitude than trial courts to con-
form their procedures to the nature of the issues arising in a particular
program, within limits set by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 4 and
other statutes.
Vesting initial review in district courts produces the advantages and dis-
advantages that attend their greater decentralization and single-judge struc-
ture. Private litigants gain more convenient fora; the judiciary conserves
two-thirds of the judges needed per case. 75 Perhaps most important, the
district courts can be expanded to handle large caseloads without encoun-
tering the structural problems that collegial courts present. Hence, Con-
gress often provides district court review of high-volume agency adjudications
involving individuals, for example social security disability7 6 and
immigration 77 programs.
Some administrative cases could be assigned initially to district court, with
discretionary review in the court of appeals for the fraction that raise issues
of broad importance. 78 Relatively fact-intensive adjudications that usually
do not present broad issues of policy and law seem the best candidates. 79
For example, review of Social Security disability determinations presently
begins in district court, with appeal of right to circuit court. Most of these
cases challenge only the evidentiary support for a determination of no dis-
ability. District court provides a relatively convenient and cheap forum for
12See Sargentich, The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Administrative Cases: Developments, 41
ADMIN. L. REV. 201 (1989).
"Currie & Goodman, supra note 3, at 6.
" 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1988).
'5Currie & Goodman, supra note 3, at 7-9.
71For overview and analysis of this program, see J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE,
MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1985).
77See generally Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Aqency Adjudication: A Study of the
Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1297 (1986).78H. FRIENDLY, supra note 14, at 176.
79The Administrative Conference so recommends; see Recommendation No. 75-3, 1 CFR
§ 305.75-3 (1990).
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claimants who are typically of modest means. Given the high volume of these
cases, existing rights to appeal burden the courts of appeals substantially.
There are several ways to structure discretionary appeals. 80 For court of
appeals resources to be conserved, screening appeals requests must be effi-
cient.8 1 To eliminate a voluminous source of appeals, assertion of legal error
rather than simple fact error by the district judge could be made a precon-
dition to appeal.
Fifth, the Commerce Court and TECA have demonstrated that a court
for a single industry or a single agency is in jeopardy of capture by its cli-
entele, or at least debilitating suspicion that it has occurred. In modern
contexts where the politics of administration is intense, as it was for railroad
regulation early in this century, similar problems might await. Regulation
in fields such as environmental quality, nuclear safety, labor relations, and
occupational health and safety leads individuals to align themselves with one
side or another. For example, law firms do not ordinarily represent clients
on both sides of these controversies. A specialized court assigned to any of
these fields would provoke wars over appointments and invite cynicism about
decisions. The fact that health and safety agencies usually have jurisdiction
over many industries is not likely to matter very much. The relevant political
dispositions-favoring the environment or economic growth, workers or
management-could still be sought in nominees and could be expected to
transcend particular industries affected by the agency.
Even if multiple industries and agencies are gathered in a single broad
theme (an environmental court, for example 82 ) these fears are justified. So
a mix of somewhat unrelated business, as the CAFC now has, appears to be
optimum. Such semispecialization resulted from using generalist judges part-
time on the wartime ECA, and seems to have aided that court's success.
Semispecialization may allow us not only to dampen appointments abuses,
but also to adjust the court's proximity to the private litigants and agencies
it hears and its identification with their problems.
Before deriving specific structural prescriptions from this history, though,
8 The agency, but not the claimant, could be provided automatic appeal from an adverse
district court ruling, in a rough effort to identify appeals likely to raise systemic issues. H.
FRIENDLY, supra note 14, at 176.
"'Currie & Goodman, supra note 3, at 20. For example, appellants could be required to
file a brief jurisdictional statement showing the presence of an issue meriting review.
8 An environmental court proposal arose as environmental law burst on the scene in the
1970s. Legislation mandated a study. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-
5, § 9, 86 Stat. 816, 899 (1972). See generally Whitney, The Case for Creating a Special Envi-
ronmental Court System, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473 (1973). The proposal died after the
executive persuasively objected that the jurisdiction of any specialized court should be broad
enough to reduce special interest pressure on appointments, to avoid overfamiliarity with
the issues and the litigants, and to keep prestige high. LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES Div.,
DEP'T OFJUSTICE, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
ON THE FEASIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN ENVIRONMENTAL COURT SYSTEM (1973) [here-
inafter PRESIDENT'S REPORT]; see also Hines & Nathanson, Preliminary Analysis of Environ-
mental Court Proposal Suggested in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,
reprinted in PRESIDENT'S REPORT app. C.
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it is necessary to separate two important variables that the preceding dis-
cussion has mixed: specialization and independence. A court's jurisdiction
can be narrow (Commerce Court), intermediate (CAFC), or broad (U.S.
District Court). The tenure of its judges can be unprotected (the pleasure
of the President), conditional (a statutory term with removal restrictions),
or complete (life tenure). Independence is also a function of the organiza-
tional placement of adjudication within an agency or in a separate institu-
tion. Although Congress has reserved general federal jurisdiction to the
constitutional judiciary, specialized functions of varying breadth have been
conferred on adjudicators whose tenure and placement also varies. I now
examine the relationship of varying degrees of independence to adjudicative
behavior. That discussion grounds analysis in the following section of the
role that Article III judges should play in overseeing their fellow adjudica-
tors in order to assure the constitutionality of specialized courts that are not
staffed by federal judges.
III. A COMPARISON OF FEDERAL ADJUDICATORS
Separation of powers analysis usually places particular officers "in" one
branch of government or another according to statutory provisions con-
trolling their appointment, responsibilities, salary, and removal, and asso-
ciated doctrines concerning their amenability to supervision by other
officers.8 3 Hence, a statement that an adjudicator belongs with the core
judiciary of Article III, the "legislative" courts of Article I, or the executive
officers of Article II implies a set of preexisting conclusions about the par-
ticular attributes of the office in question.
Since federal adjudicators are all appointed by the President or by other
executive officers, it is the other variables that determine degrees of inde-
pendence. The Constitution's focus on life tenure and salary stability as
attributes of federal judges suggests that the constitutional stature of other
adjudicators depends mostly on their job security.1
4
Certainly the relative security of adjudicators' tenure implies the inde-
pendence of their judgment, at least when we consider broad differences in
protection. A legislative judge with a fifteen-year term is obviously less vul-
nerable to outside pressure than a cabinet secretary serving at the pleasure
of the President. Difficulty arises, however, in marginal comparisons, for
example between long statutory terms and life tenure. Moreover, focusing
on formal tenure may obscure the importance of actual practice. Expecta-
tions created when a class of adjudicators almost never suffers removal can
furnish real independence of judgment. Constitutional distinctions among
such similar categories seem evanescent.
Perhaps, then, we must retreat to pure formalism: the Constitution knows
"P. SHANE & H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER, ch. 4 (1988).
"A cynic might note the obvious appeal to a law professor of any theory that links job
prestige to tenure.
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two categories, the life-tenured and everyone else, no matter the legal or
practical protections available to the unanointed. If so, constitutional req-
uisites for exercise of the judicial power will focus on the roles assigned
federal judges and on their relationships with other adjudicators, without
regard to particular characteristics of the latter. As we shall see, constitu-
tional analysis has that characteristic. To aid prescriptive analysis, though,
we need to survey the legal and practical tenure of adjudicators in the var-
ious branches of government, and the differences in behavior that follow
differences in their assigned roles.
A. Federal Judges
Of course, all federal judges share the same tenure protections, and today
no one doubts their independence. 5 I discuss them only to note some dif-
ferences between district and circuit judges that bear on the assignment to
them of administrative review responsibilities.
Single-judge district courts lack the collegial mechanisms by which the
courts of appeals seek correct and consistent outcomes.8 6 Multi-member
panels dampen the idiosyncracy or incompetence of a single judge. Thus,
circuit judges have independence from other branches of government, but
not decisional independence from one another. Joint decisionmaking ben-
efits both from deliberative interchange and from the need to articulate a
legally supportable reason for a decision. Indeed, Congress has sometimes
reined in district judges in sensitive areas of public policy by forbidding
issuance of injunctions or by requiring three-judge courts. Similarly, the fact
that districtjudges handling constitutional litigation now exercise great (and
controversial) power over public bodies, such as school boards and jails, does
not necessarily commend the single-judge model for expanded use in major
administrative controversies.
8 7
District court decentralization also hinders the formation of a relatively
uniform body of law over a large territory s8 A single judge's decision on
an important point of law should not qualify as the "law of the circuit."
Inconsistencies result, yet en banc procedures for the district courts remain
at a distinctly experimental stage.8 9 Hence, although fact-intensive admin-
istrative cases can appropriately be assigned to district judges, controversies
raising broad issues of law or policy should go to the courts of appeals, where
mechanisms to promote legal uniformity are more feasible. 90
8 The controversies early in our national life about impeaching judges on grounds other
than commission of serious crimes were settled in favor of the judges. L. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 129-31 (2d ed. 1985).
86Currie & Goodman, supra note 3, at 10-12.
87For an overview and analysis of such litigation, see Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
"8Currie & Goodman, supra note 3, at 15-16.
59Bartels, United States District Courts En Banc-Resolving the Ambiguities, 73 JUDICATURE
40(1989).
9°See generally Bruff, CoordinatingJudicial Review in Administrative Law (forthcoming, UCLA
L. REV.).
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The experience of circuit judges may make them better suited than dis-
trictjudges to exercise administrative review, because appellatejudges always
serve as restrained reviewers of decisions by others, not initial triers of fact.
A district judge, possessed of tools for original fact-finding and accustomed
to their use, may be reluctant to lay them aside. Still, district judges should
be able to understand the dominant standard for judicial review of formal
agency adjudication, the "substantial evidence" test, because the leading
Supreme Court case explicitly analogized the reviewing court's role to that
of a trial judge deciding what issues to leave with a jury. 9'
The courts of appeals follow procedures designed for resolution of issues
of law. 92 Their intellectual process is abstract. Their physical location, espe-
cially in the D.C. Circuit, is often remote from the impact of administration
around the nation. With their high degree of insulation from political pres-
sures, appellate judges may be tempted to cast themselves in the role of
guardians of the public interest, against a tendency of bureaucrats to yield
to powerful interests. 93 District judges, on the other hand, are fact-finders,
given to specifics. They are dispersed around the nation, and have closer
ties to their communities than do appellate judges. They see administration
at the point of impact, and experience its factual context in their court-
rooms. Small wonder, then, if there are often differences in perspective
about government programs between trial and appellate judges. Most
broadly, one might say that district judges are more isolated than circuit
judges from the rest of their own branch, yet are less isolated from practical
pressures flowing from the litigation they decide.
B. Legislative Judges
Outside the constitutional judiciary, judges of Article I legislative courts
most closely approximate the formal independence of federal judges. Their
statutory terms are the longest in government. 94 For example, Claims Court
judges have fifteen-year terms, and are removable by the CAFC only for
cause or disability. 95 Tax Court judges also serve for fifteen years, and are
removable by the President only for cause. 96
Renewable terms risk executive influence on legislative courts, as judges
curry favor in hopes of reappointment. For several reasons, though, this
risk seems small. First, legislative courts have had low political profiles, so
that the prospect of attracting presidential attention is reduced. To be sure,
the executive agencies and interest groups that practice before these courts
have incentives to monitor judicial performance and to lobby for or against
9"Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.).
92Unless otherwise noted, this paragraph reports conclusions of R. MELNICK, REGULATION
AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, ch. 10 (1983).
"See Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
"'Except for the Comptroller General, who has a fifteen-year, nonrenewable term due to
the sensitivity of the auditing function. 31 U.S.C. § 703(b) (1988).
9'28 U.S.C. §§ 172(a), 176 (1988). Removal is by a majority of the court, after a hearing.
"26 U.S.C. § 7443(e), (1) (1988). Again, opportunity for a hearing is provided.
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reappointment. To some extent, these influences counterbalance. Perhaps,
then, reappointment opportunities serve mostly to dampen obvious bias by
legislative judges, of a sort that would provoke someone's intense opposition
to continuation. Second, as the foregoing analysis suggests, there has been
a practice of nearly automatic reappointment to these courts. 7 Third, the
statutory terms span enough of a person's career to diminish the lure of
reappointment for all but the youngest appointees. Perhaps hope of pro-
motion to an Article III court causes some judges on legislative courts to
curry presidential favor, butjudges on lower federal courts also feel the lure
of ambition.
Fear of removal cannot cause many sleepless nights for any legislative
judge who eschews conduct that would impeach a federal judge. Statutory
removal restrictions remain undefined due to a void of litigated removals.
And process protections flowing from statute or due process make it unlikely
that the authority possessing removal power will think the battle worth the
effort.98 After all, thejudge's tenure will eventually expire, even if thejudge
does not.
When we seek a truly independent adjudicator, institutional separation is
nearly as important a tool as a tenure guarantee. Article I judges do reside
in separate organizations from the agencies they review, but they remain
less independent than are district judges. The vulnerability of specialized
adjudication to perceptions of capture is partly due to the effects of a steady
diet of subject matter and repeated advocacy from a single source. Thus,
even formally separate institutions can come to share values, if the informal
links between them are strong enough.
C. Administrative Adjudicators
There is a fundamental difference between agencies and Article I courts.
The latter are true courts, in the sense that they do nothing but adjudicate. 9
They make policy only as all courts do, incidentally to the decision of cases.
Agencies, on the other hand, use adjudication along with rulemaking and
enforcement processes as tools for the articulation of policy as well as its
application to particular parties. 00 This central and distinctive characteristic
of the administrative process has led to some structural and legal accom-
modations that affect adjudicative independence. For agencies have legiti-
mate interests in supervising the performance of their adjudicative processes
in ways that might be inappropriate for Article I judges.
91See H. DUBROFF, supra note 35, at 212 n.335 (since 1924, only three members of Tax
Court and its predecessor have been denied reappointment).
9"See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 770 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
99Although some legislative courts have lost Article III status due to "administrative"
responsibilities such as reporting claims recommendations to Congress, such functions are
incidental to the main duties of these courts, and seem readily separable as well. See supra
note 12.
1°0 This has long been clear. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974);
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
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Administrative law displays a basic ambivalence about adjudicative neu-
trality-the benefits of obtaining knowledgeable decisionmaking are gained
at the risk of introducing unacceptable levels of bias or interest. This tension
between expertise and bias has existed for centuries.'0' Today's accommo-
dation, which is basic to the legitimacy of administrative adjudication, is a
set of statutory controls that somewhat resemble judicial structure and pro-
cedure. 0 2 These are: organizational separation of investigative and adju-
dicative staffs below the level of the heads of an agency, the statutory
guarantees of independence that administrative law judges (ALJs) enjoy,
and the APA's adjudicative procedures, which are designed to balance infor-
mality and fairness.
The Supreme Court has upheld this general arrangement against due
process attack.0 3 The Court values the protections flowing from separation
of functions and procedural guarantees; 0 4 it tolerates some loss of neutrality
as the cost of obtaining the policymaking advantages of combined functions
at the top of the agency.105 Nevertheless, the Court has made it clear that a
scheme's particular characteristics can present unacceptable dangers of bias
or interest.
0 6
Congress has sometimes separated adjudicators entirely from the rest of
an agency. This step is feasible for fact-intensive matters such as enforce-
ment proceedings, where adjudication is not central to general policymak-
ing. Moreover, enforcement presents especially sensitive concerns for the
fairness of adjudication. This "split enforcement" pattern is prominent in
the Department of Labor. 07 It brings charges against those who violate
regulations issued under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
101See Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARv. L. REV. 30, 34 (1926).
102See Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1279 (1975) ("the further
the tribunal is removed from . . . any suspicion of bias, the less may be the need for other
procedural safeguards").
'°3Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (state board of medical examiners could both
investigate and decide charges against a doctor).
'4See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980) (administrator acting as prosecutor
could make preliminary assessment of civil penalties when administrative law judge adjudi-
cated the penalties).
1°0 See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (legislature can draw administrators from
an organization sympathetic to the rules to be enforced); Hortonville Joint School Dist. No.
I v. Hortonville Education Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482 (1976) (school board could both negotiate
with teachers and discharge them for illegal strike after negotiations failed); FTC v. Cement
Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948) (FTC Commissioners could both testify before Congress
regarding the illegality of a practice and later adjudicate the matter).
1'
6For example, in Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), the Court would not allow a
licensing board drawn from one-half of a state's optometrists to decide whether the other
half were engaged in unprofessional conduct. See also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)
(town mayor could not adjudicate where fines paid his salary); Ward v. Village of Monroeville,
409 U.S. 57 (1972) (Tumey controlled where fines formed a substantial part of municipal
revenues).
'17 Other examples are National Transportation Safety Board adjudication of Federal Avi-
ation Administration charges against pilots, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1422, 1429 (1988), and Merit
Systems Protection Board adjudication of charges against federal employees. 5 U.S.C. § 1201
(1988).
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and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 before special adju-
dicatory agencies. 108 After study, the Administrative Conference was unable
to conclude whether split enforcement better promotes fairness than tra-
ditional agency structure. 10 9 Not surprisingly, there are signs of confusion
over policymaking responsibilities. 10 In short, split enforcement is not a
cure-all for structural tensions in the administrative process.
The degree to which administrative procedure must mimicjudicial norms
is controlled by due process doctrine. The leading case is Mathews v. Eld-
ridge, "' which upheld the constitutionality of the SSA's procedures for adju-
dicating disability benefits. The Court called for a utilitarian calculus that
weighs the individual's interest in the benefits, the government's interest in
informality, and the accuracy of existing procedures. 212 Eldridge signaled
the Court's awareness of the limits of judicial capacity to improve complex
administrative schemes, especially through the imposition of procedures like
those of common law courts.' 'l Most administrative adjudication is not very
vulnerable to constitutional invalidation under the due process clause. Even
though the Eldridge formulation is indeterminate in application and may be
an inappropriate way to approach individual rights, 1 4 it should suffice to
ensure that adjudication is minimally fair.' 
15
Within agencies, the trial judges usually have substantial guarantees of
independence. This has not always been the case. Passage of the APA in
1946 was spurred partly by complaints that agencies used hearing examiners
08Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1988); Federal
Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, 30 U.S.C. § 823 (1988).
1°'Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommen-
dation No. 86-4, 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-4 (1990); see Johnson, The Split-Enforcement Model: Some
Conclusions from the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 1986 ACUS 293.
"0 See, e.g., Dole v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 891 F.2d 1495 (10th
Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 3235 (1990) (courts defer to Commission's interpretation
of regulation rather than Secretary's).
1"424 U.S. 319 (1976).
1i2424 U.S. at 335. The Court thought that SSA procedures were adequately geared to
the nature of the participants and issues involved in the program, and it emphasized the
need to defer to legislative judgments about optimal procedure.
"3 See also Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985); Board
of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978). In the massive entitlements programs like SSA
disability or VA benefits, the government's interest lies in minimizing the sum of process
and error costs. The agency is best situated to balance these factors. Moreover, the nonad-
versary character of administrative hearings is closely related to the substantive goals of these
programs, which are paternalistic. See Walters, 473 U.S. at 322-23. Administrative procedure
is structured to favor the claimant, since the government is not formally represented, and
new evidence factoring the claim can be introduced at any stage.
"4SeegenerallyJ. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985).
''"The evolution of administrative law protections for the fairness of adjudication may have
helped persuade the Court that juries are not needed to check agency discretion. In Atlas
Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977), the
Court held that the Seventh Amendment does not apply to the assessment of civil penalties
in an administrative adjudication. See also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) (holding
that the Seventh Amendment does apply to civil penalty actions brought in district court,
and distinguishing Atlas Roofing as "holding that the Seventh Amendment is not applicable
to administrative proceedings," 481 U.S. at 418 n.4).
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who lacked objectivity because the agency controlled their tenure. ' 6 The
APA included basic "separation of functions" requirements, forbidding
examiners to be supervised by investigative or prosecutorial personnel. 7
The examiners' modern counterparts, administrative law judges, enjoy
statutory tenure protections that justify their loftier title." 8 Agencies select
new ALJs from lists of qualified persons maintained by the Office of Per-
sonnel Management. OPM, not the employing agency, determines their pay
and promotion." 9 ALJs are assigned to cases in rotation and may not per-
form duties inconsistent with those of an ALJ.120 They may be removed
only for good cause, as determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board
after a hearing.'2' Not surprisingly, agencies that do not use ALJs to make
initial decisions endure criticism regarding the fairness of their processes.
22
For many years, ALJs were in little danger of removal by disciplinary
proceedings.'23 A recent, sharp upturn in the frequency of removal attempts,
though, signals ALJs that their indefinite terms of office are not the practical
equivalent of tenure until retirement. 24 Nevertheless, it seems to be gen-
erally understood that removal is not proper for reasons that threaten deci-
sional independence of the ALJs, as opposed to misconduct, unethical
behavior, or poor work habits (for example, low productivity). 25 Th'is, even
principles of decisional independence do not free ALJs from all types of
administrative control by the agency that employs them. 126 Although the
line between independence and administrative control is ultimately evanes-
cent, working definitions often state that ALJs must follow law and policy
"!Lubbers, Federal Agency Adjudications: Trying to See the Forest and the Trees, 31 FED. B.
NEWS &J. 383 (1984); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 478-79 (1951).
175 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2) (1988). See generally Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of
Functions in the Federal Administrative Agencies, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 759 (1981).
"'See generally P. BURGER, JUDGES IN SEARCH OF A COURT: CHARACTERISTICS, FUNCTIONS,
AND PERCEPTIONS OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (1984); Lubbers, Federal
Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible Judiciary, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 109 (1981);
Cass, Models of Administrative Action, 72 VA. L. REV. 363, 377-80 (1986).
-"5 U.S.C. § 5372 (1988).
.25 U.S.C. § 3105 (1988); see Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S.
128, 139-40 (1953) (approving a rotation scheme for examiners that reflected their ability
to handle difficult cases).
1215 U.S.C. § 7521 (1988).
'22 See Aman, supra note 61, at 587-92 (Department of Energy).
123Timony, Disciplinary Proceedings Against Federal Administrative Law Judges, 6 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 807, 807 n.I (1984) (four proceedings in thirty years).
'24See generally Rosenblum, Contexts and Contents of "For Good Cause" as Criterion for Removal
of Administrative Law Judges: Legal and Policy Factors, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 593 (1984).
2 -ld.; Timony, supra note 123, at 822.
12'Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Conf., 345 U.S. 128, 142 (1953) (ALJs "were not to be paid,
promoted or discharged at the whim or caprice of the agency or for political reasons," but
were subject to personnel practices including "reduction in force for lack of funds ...
decrease of work, and similar reasons"). See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978)
(referring to "the importance of preserving the independent judgment" of ALJs); 43 Op.
Att'y Gen. No. 9 at 3 (1977) (APA provides "a certain degree of independence of status but
not complete independence from administrative control.").
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of the agency, and are free from interference only in their fact judgments
in particular cases.1
27
An illustration of the difficulty of defining the appropriate degree of inde-
pendence for ALJs is provided by a controversy in the SSA's disability ben-
efits program. 2 Turmoil followed SSA's initiation of case disposition goals
for individual ALJs, along with a quality assurance program that identified
ALJs whose decisions deviated markedly from the average reversal rate of
initial benefits denials.12 9 Pressure ensued to keep production up and allow-
ance of claims down. 30 The controversy abated somewhat when SSA mod-
ified the program to review allowances at random.' 3' This episode gave
monitoring an unnecessarily bad name because the executive oversight tech-
nique seemed designed to skew the outcome of pending adjudications
regardless of their merits, thereby invading the realm of fact judgment that
has usually been regarded as sacrosanct.
The SSA controversy reveals the enduring tensions that attend the incom-
pleteness of separation of functions in the agencies.132 The ALJs are in, but
not of, the agencies. Proposals currently circulate to form them into a sep-
arate corps, free of residual agency influence.' 33 Yet the agencies do retain
a legitimate interest in ALJ performance. If an ALJ systematically diverges
from the agency's view of its statute or its policies on methods of fact deter-
mination, the agency bears a responsibility to try to avert the resulting ine-
quality or illegality. The federal courts lack the perspective to monitor and
correct systemic deficiencies in programs like disability benefits. The agency
has the capacity to gather the necessary information and to send signals that
127Rosenblum, supra note 124, at 617. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983)
(upholding particular HHS instructions to ALJs). See also Recommendations of the Admin-
istrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation No. 78-2, 1 C.F.R. § 305.78-2
(1990) ("[m]aintaining the administrative law judges' decisional independence does not pre-
clude the articulation of appropriate productivity norms or efforts to secure adherence to
previously enunciated standards and policies"); M. RUHLEN, MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGES 79 (rev. ed. 1982) ("[i]t is the Judge's duty to decide all cases in accordance
with agency policy").
'28See generally Levy, Social Security Disability Determinations: Recommendations for Reform,
1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 476-502. See also Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989);
W.C. v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1987).
'29See generally Note, Preserving the Judicial Independence of Federal Administrative LawJudges:
Are Existing Protections Sufficient?, 4 J. LAW & POL. 207, 217-22 (1987); Note, Administrative
Law Judges, Performance Evaluation, and Production Standards: Judicial Independence Versus
Employee Accountability, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 591 (1986).
" SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF GOV'T MANAGEMENT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON Gov-
ERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., THE ROLE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
IN THE TITLE 11 SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM 36 (Comm. print 1983).
'Association of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C. 1984).
112See J. MASHAW, supra note 76, at 41-44. Professor Asimow, supra note 117, at 759 n. 1,
notes that in 1941 Professor Nathanson could refer to separation of functions controversy
as a "hardy perennial." By now, it is an oak.
'13See generally Symposium, Administrative Law Judges, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 587 (1984);
Lubbers, A Unified Corps of ALJs: A Proposal to Test the Idea at the Federal Level, 65JUoICATURE
266 (1981).
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will register, both through general policymaking and through managerial
monitoring.
An agency's final decision is often vested in its head officers. 13 4 At this
level, sharp differences in formal tenure appear. Members of the independ-
ent regulatory agencies serve substantial terms (shorter, though, than Arti-
cle I judges) and are usually removable by the President only for cause.
135
Presidents rarely remove these commissioners, 3 6 although a whiff of scan-
dal and a threat of removal force an occasional resignation. Three potent
factors deter active presidential supervision and removal. First, the Supreme
Court has made broad statements supporting the independence of these
officers from presidential supervision. 3 7 Second, Congress is quite jealous
of its hegemony over the independent agencies, and can be expected to react
strongly to any executive poaching. 38 Third, removal of an officer who
adjudicates can offend due process and statutory restrictions on outside
interference with decisions in particular cases.13 9
Cabinet officers, who sometimes finally decide adjudicative matters,
140
serve at the pleasure of the President. Nevertheless, as a consequence of the
third factor above, it is generally understood that presidential supervision
of execution should steer clear of interference in adjudications, no matter
who performs them. 14' Nor is presidential interest in and dislike of a partic-
ular decision likely to rise to the point of firing a subordinate whose per-
formance is otherwise satisfactory. Indeed, cabinet officers having
adjudicative responsibilities often find it wise to delegate them to less polit-
ically involved subordinates,142 thereby divesting themselves of control over
114Above the ALJs, some agencies have intermediate appellate review boards. Cass, Allo-
cation of Authority Within Bureaucracies: Empirical Evidence and Normative Analysis, 66 B.U.L.
REV. 1 (1986); Freedman, Review Boards in the Administrative Process, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 546
(1969).
'"1E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1988) (Federal Trade Commissioner serves seven years and is
removable by President only for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office").
The constitutionality of this provision, on which many later ones are based, was upheld by
the Supreme Court in Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
'16For an exception, see Berry v. Reagan, 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) T 33,898 (D.D.C.),
vacated as moot, 732 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
'"Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 628-30. See Scalia, Historical Anomalies in Administrative
Law, SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY YEARBOOK 1985, at 110 (remarking that the
case "continues to induce the Executive to leave the policy control of the independent
agencies to congressional committees, and fastidiously to avoid any appearances of influence
in those entities").
'For an example of congressional attitudes about agency independence, see SENATE COMM.
ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 5 STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, REGULATORY ORGANI-
ZATION, S. Doc. No. 91, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1977).
'"See Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966)(condemning congressional pres-
sure on a pending adjudication); 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1988).
140E.g., United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941) (Secretary of Agriculture).
'4 ABA COMMISSION ON LAW & THE ECONOMY, FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM
79-84 (1979) (recommending presidential authority to intervene in agency decisions except
for adjudications).
1
42 For example, the Environmental Protection Agency has a judicial officer. See generally,
Hercules Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 119-28 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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the decisions unless and until the delegation is rescinded. 43 Unlike ALJs,
these officers may enjoy no formal tenure protections, 14 4 but there is often
de facto job security. 1
45
Thus, all of our nonconstitutional judges can decide cases without serious
fear of removal for a particular decision. Perhaps, though, the Article I
officers derive somewhat greater independence than ALJs or independent
agency commissioners enjoy, due to the longer assured term or the title of
judge.
Still, there is a basic difference in the vulnerability of decisions of adju-
dicators to reversal by higher authority. The courts of appeals review find-
ings of Article Ijudges as they do those of district judges, under the "clearly
erroneous" standard.146 In administrative law, officers reviewing ALJ find-
ings are not constrained by any deferential standard. Instead, courts review
the agency's final decision for substantial evidence on the whole record, and
grant the ALJ's contribution only "such probative force as it intrinsically
commands."' 147 The substantial evidence and clearly erroneous tests are
approximately equivalent; if anything, courts are supposed to defer some-
what more to agencies than to district judges. 148 Hence, it is the agency's
final deciders and not its ALJs whose decisions are difficult to displace.
Some differences in behavior between Article I trial judges and ALJs stem
from differences in their assigned roles. Although the common law trial
model probably fits Article I judges about as well as it does district judges,
ALJs often depart from the norms of the adversary system. First, in their
traditional service in economic regulation, ALJs have freely articulated pol-
icy proposals for agency consideration. Second, their role has evolved
substantially:
[I]t is inescapable that the administrative law judge in today's Federal Govern-
ment has become less an organizer and initial decider of regulatory policy issues
and more the (often-final) dispenser of disability benefits or arbiter of civil money
penalties-cases where factfinding, demeanor evidence, fairness and speed are
hallmarks, and policy issues absent or submerged.
49
Moreover, this more usual modern service in fact-intensive adjudication is
often defined nonadversarially. In the mass benefits programs such as SSA
disability, the government is not formally represented and the ALJs are
141United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
'44See, e.g., Kalaris v. Donovan, 697 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (members of Department of
Labor's Benefits Review Board lack protected tenure).
'45See Koch & Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the Operation and Utility of the
Social Security Administration's Appeals Council, 17 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 199, 269 (1990).
'46 FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a) (1) (1988) requires the courts of appeals to
review Tax Court decisions in the "same manner" as those of district courts.
147Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 495 (1951).
14'Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34 n.74 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976).
'49Lubbers, supra note 116, at 385. See also Pops, Judicialization of Federal Administrative
Law Judges: Implications for Policymaking, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 169 (1979).
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charged with an active role in developing the claimant's case. 150 The Supreme
Court, upholding the constitutionality of a statutory provision that effec-
tively excluded lawyers from the Veterans Administration claims process,
stressed the nonadversarial, inquisitorial, and paternalistic aspects of the
program, which the introduction of lawyers might disrupt.' 5'
Even when Article I judges and ALJs have superficially similar responsi-
bilities, there may be real behavioral differences. Agencies make policy not
only through substantive regulations that have the force of law, but also
through interpretive regulations and other informal policy statements that
have an uncertain capacity to bind adjudicators.152 It may be that ALJs treat
the interpretive and informal policies of their employing agency with more
deference than an Article I judge would accord to the policy of a formally
separate agency. For example, IRS interpretive regulations probably receive
more independent scrutiny in the Tax Court than do similar SSA policy
statements before their ALJs.
More generally, those who work within an agency are subject to a mul-
titude of open or subtle socializing pressures that do not reach a separate
institution.153 For example, an increase or decrease in the staff assigned to
a task may signal its importance to agency personnel, or headquarters may
grumble about the number of claims being honored. These pressures may
be more important than formally stated policy, but they may be very diffi-
cult to detect and monitor from the outside. This does not mean that they
are necessarily pernicious- for example, a tradition of devotion to high
quality public service is to be hoped, if not expected, of every agency.
Overall, the job security of federal adjudicators correlates with their inde-
pendence from the policy preferences of agencies. Federal judges rank the
highest in both variables; legislative judges, in the middle; agency adjudi-
cators, the lowest. Although these were mostly variations in degree, they
are worth considering when designing institutions. Before proceeding to
some recommendations for that task, I pause to review some governing
constitutional considerations.
IV. NOTES ON CONSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 154
Everyone agrees that congressional power to allocate adjudicative func-
tions among legislative courts, administrative agencies, and constitutional
'50See, e.g., Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 470-76 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring
and Marshall, J., concurring) (complaining about sufficiency of ALJ's discharge of "duty of
inquiry").
"'Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
1
5 2Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-03 (1979) (explaining the difference between
substantive and interpretive regulations, and declining to defer to the latter). See also Amer-
ican Bus Ass'n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (delineating the murky
boundary between these categories of regulation); Koch, Public Procedures for the Promulgation
of Interpretive Rules and General Statements of Policy, 64 GEo. L.J. 1047 (1976).
'53SeeJ. MASHAW, supra note 76, ch. 7; Koch & Koplow, supra note 145, at 239.
'54The title of this section is a bow to a fine article by the late Paul Bator. Bator, The
SUMMER 1991 Specialized Courts 353
courts is broad. No clear limits have emerged; the Supreme Court cases are
notoriously obscure. This is not the place to grapple with the tar baby, but
it is necessary to outline some fundamentals about the use of specialized
courts.
A dilemma confounds the constitutional analysis. Separation of powers
principles suggest that some "inherent" or "core" functions may not be
taken from the constitutional courts. Identifying these, however, is no easy
matter. For we cannot simply require that all adjudicative functions be placed
in the federal courts and not elsewhere.' 55 Many adjudicative activities are
"executive" in the sense that they may or must be placed in that branch. 56
For example, the first Congress enacted statutes vesting determinations of
veterans' benefits and customs duties in executive officers. 57 Thus, adju-
dication has been both ajudicial and an executive function from the outset. 15
To further complicate matters, a theory of legislative courts arose in Amer-
ican Insurance Co. v. Canter. 59 Chief Justice Marshall held that the creation
Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Article 111, 65 IND. L.J.
233 (1990). The article appears in Symposium, Paul Bator: Legislative and Administrative Courts
Under Article 111, 65 IND. L.J. Number 2 (1990). See also Fallon, Of Legislative Courts' Admin-
istrative Agencies, and Article 111, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915 (1988); Sager, The Supreme Court,
1980 Term: Foreword-Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction
of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981).
"5The Court has inadvertently demonstrated why a simple formalist distinction will not
suffice for separation of powers purposes, by remarking that "[iInterpreting a law enacted
by Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of 'execution' of the
law." Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986). Yet this definition also describes much
of what the federal courts do. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 963-67 (1983) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (characterizing congressional supervision of agency action performed by adju-
dication as unconstitutional intervention in a judicial function); Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 748-53
(Stevens, J., concurring).
I56Bator, supra note 154, at 263-65. Examples include many of the President's exercises
of law-applying judgment pursuant to statutes or the Constitution. See Bruff, Judicial Review
and the President's Statutory Powers, 68 VA. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1982). True, most adjudication
that occurs in administrative agencies and legislative courts could be assigned to the federal
courts under the federal question jurisdiction. To do so, however, could create a vastly
bloated judiciary and an equally shrunken executive.
'57Fallon, supra note 154, at 919. Perhaps Congress thought that these claims against the
government were otherwise barred by sovereign immunity, and were therefore fit for exec-
utive determination. The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity was not clearly received
into our law until the nineteenth century, however. See P. SHANE & H. BRUFF, supra note
83, at 43.
' 8The Court understood this. In Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land Improvement Co.,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855), the Court considered the validity of a warrant issued by a
Treasury officer who had made adjudicative determinations: "That [setting the amount of
a duty] may be, in an enlarged sense, a judicial act, must be admitted .... In this sense the
act of the President in calling out the militia under [a statute], or of a commissioner who
makes a certificate for the extradition of a criminal, under a treaty, is judicial." Id. at 274.
Perhaps perceiving-and wishing to obscure-this point, the Supreme Court soon approved
the placement of various adjudicative functions in the executive by labelling them "executive"
or "administrative." Young, Public Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From Murray's Lessee
Through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REv. 765, 795-98 (1986). For example, the Court
upheld the Secretary of the Navy's denial of death benefits to the widow of Admiral Decatur.
Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840).
'526 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828).
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of Florida's territorial court, whose judges had four-year terms, was a valid
exercise of the legislative powers of Congress, and was therefore freed of
Article III requirements. Marshall's sweeping rationale has suffered with-
ering criticism. 60 No matter, Marshall's basic notion that Congress could
rely on its Article I powers to create adjudicative bodies has endured. Indeed,
it is easy to see why some place for legislative courts would be found in the
Constitution, and equally easy to see why setting limits would prove vexing.
By the time Canter was decided, overlap between judicial and executive
functions was already visible. If executive bodies having few or none of the
traditional tenure and process safeguards of the courts could adjudicate,
why not bodies having some of those safeguards? Moreover, the diversity of




Yet once these general concessions are made, it becomes very hard to
know where to stop. 16 All federal statutes must rest on a grant of power
somewhere in Article I--may all implementation of these powers therefore
be committed to Article I courts? And at what point does the formation of
legislative courts intrude not on judicial but on executive authority, by
infringing the President's power to supervise execution? 63
The Supreme Court's traditional formulation of the limit to congressional
power is the doctrine that "public rights" can be decided outside constitu-
tional courts. 164 In practice, the doctrine has involved more labeling than
'6°C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURrs 41-42 (4th ed. 1983); M. REDISH, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 36-39 (1980).
I6 tFor example, courts-martial, traditionally viewed as legislative courts, see United States
ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955), reflect both special characteristics of the




1A modern case that exemplifies the persisting confusion is Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370
U.S. 530 (1962). The Court held that the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, which had previously been held to be legislative courts, Williams v. United
States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933); Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929), were Article III
courts. But no majority could be mustered for a rationale. Three justices thought that they
had always been constitutional courts; two, that they had been so since Congress had so
designated them; two, that they remained legislative courts. Justice Harlan's plurality opinion
suggested that Congress might need special justification to create legislative courts, "when
the peculiar reasonsjustifying investiture ofjudges with limited tenure have not been present,
the Canter holding has not been deemed controlling," 370 U.S. at 548, yet assumed that no
"inherently" judicial business was involved in this case. Id. at 549.
16 Consider the independent agencies, which are sometimes characterized as legislative
courts as though that diminishes concern for their legitimacy. Sommer, Independent Agencies
as Article One Tribunals: Foundations of a Theory of Agency Independence, 39 ADMIN. L. REV.
83, 94-100 (1987).
1641t originated in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 272 (1856), which upheld a summary procedure for the government to recoup its
funds from its customs collectors. After opining that Congress could not withdraw from the
courts any "matter which, from its nature" is judicial, the Court noted that: "At the same
time there are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such form that
the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial deter-
mination, but which congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of
the United States, as it may deem proper." Id. at 284. The Court's opaqueness probably
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analysis, but at least it has sanctioned the creation of the administrative
state. 65 Crowell v. Benson"6 6 established the modern theoretical foundation
for delegating adjudicative power to administrative agencies.1 67 The Court
rejected a due process assault on administrative factfinding, because the
courts were allowed to decide issues of law on judicial review (including the
presence of substantial evidence for the agency's findings). 6 The basic
strategy of Crowell, then, was to allow administrative adjudication as long as
vital judicial controls were present. 69 Congress was free to allocate initial
authority to tribunals that might be temporary, specialized, and informal,
without staffing them with federal judges, as long as appropriate appellate
jurisdiction remained in the federal courts. 70
Crowell's theoretical compromise still holds sway, although the Court has
struggled in recent years to find the limits of congressional power to convert
traditional judicial functions into public rights to be adjudicated by agencies
or legislative courts.' In Commodity Futures Trading Com'n v. Schor, 72 the
Court allowed agency adjudicators to entertain state law counterclaims in
reparation proceedings, in which disgruntled customers seek redress for
brokers' violations of statutes or regulations. Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion asked whether the new forum exercised the "range ofjurisdiction
and powers normally vested only in Article III courts," and whether the
latter retained the "essential attributes ofjudicial power." 71 Only the juris-
diction over counterclaims differed from the usual agency model. 174 Thus,
Schor suggests that agencies may resolve even a traditional state-law claim
stemmed from its recognition of the overlap of judicial and executive functions, which it
drew from Marshall's earlier insight. Id. at 280.
165Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 630-32 (1984); Bruff, Public Programs, Private Deciders: The Consti-
tutionality of Arbitration in Federal Programs, 67 TEX. L. REV. 441, 468-77 (1989).
.66285 U.S. 22 (1932).
'61Congress had created a worker's compensation scheme for longshoremen. An agency
was authorized to decide claims under formal adjudicative procedures resembling those later
codified in the APA (an examiner was to conduct evidentiary hearings on a record). Id. at
47-48.
'68The Court held, however, that courts must perform independent review of issues of
constitutional or jurisdictional fact going to the power of the agency in the premises, such
as whether an accident had occurred on the navigable waters. Id. at 63-64. The doctrines
of constitutional and jurisdictional fact have since fallen into desuetude. Monaghan, Consti-
tutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 249-50 (1985).
1
69See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1372-85 (1953).
"7 Bator, supra note 154, at 266-68.
'7 See sources cited supra notes 154 & 165; see also Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative
Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197.
712478 U.S. 833 (1986).
17 1d. at 851. Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissenting, argued that the majority was
allowing the undue dilution of judicial authority in service of legislative convenience. Id. at
863-65.
171The CFTC's jurisdiction was specialized; its enforcement powers were limited; its orders
received normal judicial review. The Court saw no reason to deny agencies all pendent
jurisdiction. Id. at 852-57.
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that is closely related to a federal issue within their jurisdiction.17 5
There are several justifications for placing adjudicative functions in the
executive. First, like common law courts, agencies use adjudication to form
policy. 17 6 Therefore, the Court's doctrine of deference to an agency's judg-
ments of law and policy extends to the adjudicative context.' Nevertheless,
the policymaking component of agency adjudication varies across a wide
spectrum. For example, compare the frank policy orientation of the Federal
Communications Commission's hearings on renewal of broadcast licenses'
with the narrow factual focus of a Social Security Administration determi-
nation of an individual's disability. 1
79
When adjudication focuses on application of a known legal criterion to
disputed facts, 8 0 the justification for transferring it out of federal court does
not evaporate. A traditional justification for creating agencies has been to
obtain speedy and informal adjudication. Congressional judgments about
the appropriateness of administrative rather than judicial process have long
been entitled to judicial weight.' 8' Moreover, shunting fact-intensive adju-
dications to agencies or to legislative courts can leave the federal courts free
for their central responsibilities of interpreting the Constitution and statutes.
Agencies and Article I courts decide issues of constitutionality, law, and
fact. Of course, these categories blur at the margin, but they aid analysis.1
8 2
Which of these issues must an Article III court review, and with what inten-
sity?183 The Supreme Court has never decided whether the due process clause
allows Congress to preclude review of an administrative decision com-
'In Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782 (1989), the Court held that a
person who had not submitted a claim against a bankruptcy estate had a right to a jury trial
when sued by the bankruptcy trustee to recover an allegedly fraudulent money transfer.
Justice Brennan's majority opinion stressed that "[i]f a statutory right is not closely inter-
twined with a federal regulatory program Congress has power to enact, and if that right
neither belongs to nor exists against the Federal Government, then it must be adjudicated
by an Article III court." Id. at 2797. The trustee's claim was not intertwined with a regulatory
program as were those in Schor; it asserted a "private right."Justice Scalia, concurring, argued
that public rights were based on sovereign immunity and were therefore restricted to claims
by or against the government. Dissenting opinions by Justices White, Blackmun, and O'Con-
nor feared a retreat from Atlas Roofing and Schor, and thought that juries were out of place
in the integrated scheme of bankruptcy law.
'76See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
'77E.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
'78See generally Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory
Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REV. 169 (1978).
'79E.g., Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983).
180 For a helpful summary of administrative law distinctions between issues of fact and law,
see NLRB v. Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583, 590-91 (2d Cir. 1961) (Friendly, J.).
8'E.g., Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
"12See Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L.J. 1, 9-14 (1985).
"'Crowell contemplated judicial review of all three, with independent judgment or the
limited deference that characterizes substantial evidence review of fact issues. Yet we must
accommodate both subsequent doctrinal developments and a competing tradition that expected
little or no judicial review of public rights cases. For the latter, see Strauss, supra note 165,
at 632: "[T]he whole point of the 'public rights' analysis" has often been that "no judicial
involvement at all was required-executive determination alone would suffice."
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pletely.184 To avoid reaching this troubling separation of powers issue, courts
often read statutes that appear to preclude all review to permit at least con-
stitutional inquiries. 185
In administrative law, statutes usually authorize rather than forbidjudicial
review. Even when review is authorized, however, courts decline to review
some executive functions, including some adjudicative ones. 8 6 Broad state-
ments about the necessity for preserving judicial review of administrative
action must be qualified by recognition that not all executive activity is suit-
able for review.' 87 The Court has emphasized, however, that nonreviewa-
bility is "a very narrow exception," applicable only when "statutes are drawn
in such broad terms that ... there is no law to apply."' 188 Nonreviewable
functions often feature broad agency discretion, needs for expertise, infor-
mality, and expedition, a large volume of potentially appealable actions, and
the presence of other methods of preventing abuses of discretion. 8 9 To the
extent that an administrative program possesses these characteristics, courts
are likely to honor statutory limits on review even if they would not invoke
nonreviewability doctrine on their own.
Congress should not restrict federal court review of constitutional issues. 90
Tenure and salary protections for federal judges were meant to insulate
them from pressure emanating from Congress and the executive. They are
ideally situated to check aggrandizement by either of the political branches,' 9 '
and to protect individual rights. And surely there is no better use for their
limited time than resolution of these issues.
Judicial review of statutory issues should also be preserved. 92 As with
constitutional questions, the law-declaring role of a generalist and inde-
pendentjudiciary is paramount. Administrative law contains numerous safe-
guards against capture of agencies by interest groups; judicial review of
questions of law is one of the most important. 93 Moreover, agencies have
significant incentives to aggrandize their own power through aggressive
18'Sager, supra note 154.
'85E.g., Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361 (1974); Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695 (D.C.
Cir.), reinstated and motion for rehearing en banc denied, 824 F.2d 1240 (1987) (limitation on
judicial review in Medicare Act does not apply to constitutional challenges to Act).
186E.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
187Indeed, the public rights doctrine arose in an era of quite limited review of executive
action. Young, supra note 158, at 795-804.
'Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (quoting the
APA's legislative history, S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945)).
18 9See generally Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency
Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REV. 367 (1968).
' 9 Fallon, supra note 154, at 975-76.
'9gStrauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish
Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 517-26 (1987); Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the
New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 448-50, 467-68 (1987).
192Fallon, supra note 154, at 976-82.
195 See Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REV. 207 (1984).
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statutory interpretation. 94 Fortunately, outright congressional preclusion
of review is rare; 95 it is also unnecessary. Judicial review of an agency's
statutory interpretations can be deferential enough to avoid unwarranted
interference with administrative discretion. 196
It is enough for constitutional courts to scrutinize the legality of generally
applicable administrative policies, procedures, and regulations, without
delving into their application to particular facts. 197 Here we depart from
Crowell, but codify existing judicial tendencies to reach issues that concern
the overall structure and validity of a statutory scheme, but to honor pre-
clusions of fact review. 98 Thus, the Supreme Court reviewed a scheme for
arbitration of certain Medicare claims, and decided that it comported with
due process. 199 A companion case, United States v. Erika, Inc.,20° found that
no judicial review of particular awards was authorized. The Court noted
that the preclusion did not extend to initial determinations of entitlement
to participate in the Medicare program, but only to the processing of indi-
vidual claims. So limited, the preclusion prevented "the overloading of the
courts with trivial matters." 20 '1 The Court subsequently held that the pre-
clusion did not extend to statutory issues concerning the overall method by
which claims are to be computed, as opposed to particular determinations
under the general criteria.
202
There are two principal reasons for restricting judicial review of facts.
First, "retail" review of fact determinations in particular cases can absorb
vastly more judicial resources than "wholesale" review of overall policy and
procedure. Yet if individual rights must suffer, we should be most reluctant
194 Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 533, 552-
54 (1989); BreyerJudicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 371
(1986).
'95A prominent historical example, actions of the Veterans Administration, has been elim-
inated by legislation that I discuss infra part V.A. See generally Rabin, Preclusion of Judicial
Review in the Processing of Claimsfor Veterans' Benefits: A Preliminary Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV.
905 (1975).
l'Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
see generally Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and Courts? 7 YALE J.
ON REG. 1 (1990).
'97Note, Congressional Preclusion ofJudicial Review of Federal Benefit Disbursement: Reasserting
Separation of Powers, 97 HARV. L. REV. 778, 792-93 (1984) (reporting that the courts have
so behaved).
198E.g., Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768 (1985). The Court
interpreted a broad preclusion provision of the Civil Service Retirement Act, 5 U.S.C. §
8347(c), to allow review of procedural irregularity, statutory misconstruction, or other error
"'going to the heart of the administrative determination,"' but not fact review. 470 U.S. at
779-81.
199Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982).
20456 U.S. 201 (1982).
20 id. at 210 n. 13 (quoting the legislative history). The Court did not, however, reach issues
concerning any constitutional right to review. Id. at 211 n.14.
202Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986). See also McNary
v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 888 (1991).
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to invoke this ground alone. 20 3 Here we must realize that "minor" admin-
istrative cases often receive only summary review in federal court, whatever
their importance to affected individuals. 20 4 Thus, raw statistics on review
caseloads can overstate both the actual burden on the courts and the con-
tribution of the constitutional judiciary to review efforts.
205
Second, stopping fact review short of federal court may actually improve
the fairness and consistency of factfinding in some administrative programs.
The SSA's disability benefits adjudications provide a prominent example.
Internal SSA mechanisms are better able to promote fairness and consis-
tency of outcome than are decentralized district courts reviewing episodi-
cally. 20 6 The agency's internal Appeals Council, which reviews ALJ decisions,
has the potential to monitor adjudications systematically and to translate
needed correctives into binding policy.
207
This does not mean, however, that agency factfinding should be final.
Legislative courts may provide acceptable substitutes for the constitutional
courts, bearing institutional benefits for both the agencies they review and
the courts they partially displace. I turn to that prospect.
V. A LEGISLATIVE COURT FOR INITIAL REVIEW OF
SELECTED AGENCY PROGRAMS
A brief review of my major conclusions so far may aid consideration of
the specific recommendations to follow. Part I described the benefits of
specialized adjudication as caseload relief for other courts, expert and effi-
cient case disposition, institutional flexibility, and promotion of a uniform
body of law. The costs were lower prestige, distortion of the appointments
process, and loss of appropriate perspective on administrative problems.
Part II concluded that the history of these courts showed needs for juris-
dictional clarity, exposure to both sides of controversies, comprehensive
control of subject matter, attention to the respective contributions of spe-
cialists and generalists in any mixed scheme, allocation of review functions
to trial or appellate courts according to their abilities, and the need to avoid
narrow specialization, with its dangers of capture.
Part III portrayed the decisional independence of legislative judges as
more resembling that of federal judges than that of agency adjudicators.
Key to this conclusion was the institutional separation that legislative courts
203See Strauss, Article III Courts and the Constitutional Structure, 65 IND. L.J. 307, 309
(1990)("Why isn't the impartial decision of specific cases the essence of the judicial function?").204See Koch & Koplow, supra note 145, at 225 n. 142 (SSA disability cases in district courts
routinely sent to magistrates for recommended decision).205See Flanders, What Do the Federal Courts Do? A Research Note, 5 REv. OF LITIGATION 199,
206 (1986) (SSA disability cases 15% to 20% of federal court filings, but perhaps only 2% of
actual workload).206J. MASHAW, supra note 76, at 187-93, 213-14, 222-23.
207Koch & Koplow, supra note 145, at 264, 302, 305. The Administrative Conference has
recommended restructuring the Appeals Council to reduce its currently overwhelming case-
load and to focus its attention on systemic improvements. I C.F.R. § 305.87-7 (1990).
SUMMER 1991
43 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 329
have from those they review, as contrasted with the compromised neutrality
that attends combination of functions in agencies.
Part IV concluded that federal courts should retain their ultimate power
to declare the law, but that legislative courts could better perform some
initial review functions. Specialized review offered special potential for more
thorough fact review, gathered in one institution for improved consistency.
From all of this no panacea emerges, for specialization is always a matter
of tradeoffs. Yet there is an institutional structure that does appear to cap-
ture most of the benefits of specialization, while minimizing its costs. That
structure employs a semi-specialized legislative court sitting nationwide to
review both high-volume, fact-intensive agency adjudications, and some other
programs that especially need specialization. From that court appeals would
flow to the CAFC, itself a semi-specialized court that can provide informed
review and that can articulate uniform national law.
Obviously, such a structure could not concentrate all review in a single
administrative court; nor should we attempt to do so.2 0 1 Instead, the point
is to be selective, picking programs that most need institutional change and
that can most benefit from the attributes of this particular scheme. Cer-
tainly, reasonable minds could differ on the particular mix of jurisdiction
to assign the new court. I offer general criteria for programs to be included,
and some specific nominees. The point of beginning is a unique structure
that Congress recently created for review of veterans' benefits determina-
tions by legislative and constitutional courts. This could form the core of a
more generalized institution for other federal programs as well.
A. The Court of Veterans Appeals
In 1988, Congress ended its longstanding preclusion ofjudicial review of
veterans' claims decisions 20 9 and created the Court of Veterans Appeals
(CVA), a legislative court with exclusive initial reviewjurisdiction over issues
of law, fact, and constitutionality arising under laws administered by the
Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA). 210 The President appoints its seven
judges for fifteen-year terms, and may remove them only for cause. The
court may sit nationwide.2 1' Although only veterans and not the VA may
invoke the court's jurisdiction, the VA does appear through its General
208For discussion of the disadvantages of a single administrative court (principally large size
and inconvenience), see Bruff, supra note 90.209See generally Rabin, supra note 195.
2 °Veterans' Benefits Improvement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105. See
generally H.R. REP. No. 963, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1988); Stichman, The Veterans'
Judicial Review Act of 1988: Congress Introduces Courts and Attorneys to Veterans' Benefits Pro-
ceedings, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 365 (1989).
2
1Congress gave the new court discretion to sit by single judges or in panels, and to decide
the extent to which it will hear cases outside Washington, D.C. 38 U.S.C. §§ 4054(b), 4055,
4056 (1988).
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Counsel. 2 12 Review is on the administrative record, and the court may set
aside VA fact determinations that are "clearly erroneous. 21 3 This test was
used in place of the more familiar "substantial evidence" or "arbitrary and
capricious" formulas in order to allow intensified fact review.
21 4
Either a veteran or the agency may appeal to the CAFC, which may con-
sider issues concerning the validity of statutes, regulations, and policies, but
not errors of fact.2 5 Some jurisdictional litigation is sure to flow from this
restriction. Where the law-fact distinction is cloudy, the legislative history
stresses the difference between decisions of general importance and those
limited to the correctness of a particular award.2 1 6 From the CAFC, review
may be sought in the Supreme Court.
Obviously, the unique politics of veterans' claims infuse this delicate
scheme. With one hand, Congress gave veterans-but not the agency-a
right to appeal to a new forum having exceptional power to overturn agency
fact judgments. With the other hand, Congress made the legislative court's
fact determinations safe from further review in federal court. Only the latter
feature is suited to wider use, however. An agency as well as an affected
individual should have appeal rights to a legislative court, to show the court
the full range of controversies the agency decides. Also, the court should
perform ordinary fact review for substantial evidence. True, the purpose
of vesting this review in a legislative court is to allow more thorough inspec-
tion of the administrative record than federal district judges can provide.
But that does not mean that the ultimate standard of review should be altered
from one that has proved itself in administrative law to another that is geared
to relationships between federal district and circuit judges.
In its other features, the scheme correctly follows principles of compar-
ative institutional competence. It recognizes that constitutional decisions
need the full independence of viewpoint that Article III courts possess. True,
agencies should consider the constitutionality of their programs and pro-
cedures insofar as their statutes allow change to meet constitutional objec-
tions.217 But neither they nor legislative courts possess the attributes for final
decision of these issues. Legislative courts such as the CVA stand in a closer
relation to the agencies they review than do Article III courts. This produces
212Athough the new court's caseload is not yet clear, estimates can be made by comparing
appeals rates in somewhat similar SSA disability cases. The SSA's Appeals Council, like the
Board of Veterans' Appeals in the VA, decides about 44,000 cases per year, from which over
13,000 appeals flowed in one recent year. See Judicial Review of Veterans' Affairs, Hearing Before
the House Comm. on Veterans' Affairs [hereinafter Hearing. judicial Review], 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 259-66 (statement of Paul R. Verkuil) (Ser. 100-60, Sept. 8, 1988).
21338 U.S.C. § 4061(a) (4) (1988).
214 Stichman, supra note 210, at 377.
2-5 38 U.S.C. § 4092 (1988).
216The CAFC may reverse a decision "resting upon a policy judgment, reasoning, or factual
premise so unacceptable as to render the matter arbitrary or capricious," but may not review
allegations of "an erroneous factual determination nor could it review the application of any
law or regulation to those facts." H. R. REP., supra note 210, at 8.
217See Note, The Authority of Administrative Agencies to Consider the Constitutionality of Statutes,
90 HARV. L. REV. 1682 (1977).
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advantages for other issues, but disadvantages for constitutional ones. For
most issues, both substantive and procedural constitutional review are sup-
posed to be deferential and unconfining; the counterweight is that they be
performed by officers whose neutrality is protected by complete independ-
ence from the political branches.
For issues of law, again the ultimate check of an Article III court is nec-
essary, but agencies and legislative courts can play unique and important
intermediate roles. Centralized legal monitoring by these entities can be
closer than in constitutional courts. The Supreme Court's recent mandates
that federal courts pay special deference to agency judgments on issues of
law 2 8 and procedure 21 9 probably resulted fromjudicial decentralization and
overload. 2 0 They also had separation of powers overtones based on the
limited role of the federal courts that would not necessarily apply with the
same force to legislative courts. Specialized initial review can deal more
confidently with issues about the structure and implied purpose of an agen-
cy's statute or about optimal procedure than can generalized judges who
touch these matters only occasionally. Also, a unified reviewing court avoids
problems of inconsistent directives to agencies that currently hamper review
by the decentralized federal courts.22 1 To be sure, this is a delicate matter.
Specialized review can readily degenerate into intrusion into issues of law
and policy that agencies should decide. Still, jurisdictional adjustments can
calibrate a court's proximity to the agencies it reviews, as we shall see.
For issues of fact, the typical structure of a legislative court, such as the
CVA, should produce sufficient independence tojustify finality. Thejudges
and their employing institution are outside the agency, and are therefore
less subject to subtle socializing influences than are ALJs or similar adjudi-
cators. Moreover, several of the factors that cause constitutional courts to
stay their hands by invoking nonreviewability doctrine are present: high
volume, a need for specialization, and the presence of an outside check on
administration.
The principal disadvantage of this structure is the danger of capture by
an agency or an interest group, or the perception that it has occurred. The
VA is meant to be responsive to veterans' interests- that is the reason for
its existence. The Court of Veterans Appeals could all too easily become
Commerce Court II. Longstanding legislative courts such as the Tax Court
and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals have weathered charges of
bias, but not without difficulty. In an effort to dampen bias by broadening
jurisdiction, proposals have floated to form a legislative court to hear appeals
"'Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2'"Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519 (1978).22 See Strauss, supra note 6.
2
2
IBruff, supra note 90.
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from many government benefits decisions, into which veterans' claims could
be folded. 22 2 Let us examine that possibility.
B. A Benefits Court
Among federal benefits programs, social security disability has produced
the most frequent proposals for specialized review. 2 3 In the wake of the
new veterans' legislation, expansion of the CVA/CAFC model to include
SSA disability has attracted support.224 The issues and procedures in federal
disability programs, or even in benefits programs more generally, are similar
enough to invite such consolidation.
225
Even if the CVA became a benefits court, though, appointments problems
would remain. The political issues are simple enough (claimant vs. taxpayer
orientation) to invite focused and intense lobbying by affected interests. For
example, veterans' and other benefits recipients' support groups would agree
on desirable characteristics in nominees. Hence I conclude that although a
new legislative court should contain a benefits review component, it should
have an even broader jurisdiction to diffuse appointments pressures.
C. A Semi-specialized Administrative Court
The best way to maximize the benefits of specialized review while mini-
mizing the detriments may be to broaden the veterans' review model to
include a range of subjects other than federal benefits. That is, the new
court's jurisdiction should be semi-specialized-broad enough to remove
litmus tests in the appointments process and to avoid comparisons to the
assembly line, narrow enough to allow regular and informed monitoring of
the agency programs selected. The exact mix of jurisdiction chosen for the
new court is not crucial if these criteria are met.
It should not be necessary to match the numbers of benefits cases with
other kinds of cases on the court's docket. (The benefits cases are so numer-
ous that an administrative court would have to be quite large to do so.) It
is enough to assign meaningful numbers of other kinds of cases, especially
those that ordinarily merit plenary review. Thus, fewer numbers of more
time-consuming cases would significantly diversify the court's daily work-
222E.g., STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 57.221See generally Rains, A Specialized Court for Social Security? A Critique of Recent Proposals, 15
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1 (1987); Arner, The Social Security Court Proposal: An Answer to a Critique,
10 J. LEGIs. 324 (1983); Ogilvy, The Social Security Court Proposal: A Critique, 9 J. LEGIS. 229
(1982); J. MASHAW, C. GOETZ, F. GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ, P. VERKUIL & M. CARROW,
SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS 146-50 (1978).
22 4Levy, supra note 128.
"25Adding SSA appeals would approximately double the CVA's caseload, and presumably
also its size. See Hearing: Judicial Review, supra note 212, at 265. See also DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT [here-
inafter, 1990 AO REPORT], Table C-2, (revealing that of the 7439 Social Security cases filed
in district courts in 1990, 7048 concerned disability (including SSI cases)). The added burden
to the CAFC is harder to estimate, due to the restriction on review of fact issues. In recent
years, there have been about 1,000 SSA appeals to the circuit courts. Levy, supra note 128,
at 480.
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load. The prestige of the court would be raised and interest in its operations
would be widespread enough to diffuse appointments pressures.
Hence I propose a new Article I Administrative Court, to have initial
review jurisdiction over selected programs, final as to fact for some of them.
Review of this court could be assigned to the Article III CAFC, reinforcing
the current status of that court as a leader in administrative review, like the
D.C. Circuit. The Administrative Court would sit nationwide, providing
single-judge review for some high-volume, fact-intensive programs such as
veterans and social security benefits. Other matters could be decided by
panels, and without factual finality. When the new court sat in such an appel-
late capacity, further review in the federal courts could be made discretion-
ary, to avoid duplicative appellate review.
Thus, either limited circuit-riding or decentralized organization would be
needed for the new court. It would not be fair to concentrate all initial
review of important agency decisions in Washington.22 6 The benefits pro-
grams, with small money value but high importance to affected individuals,
especially demand a local forum.2 27 Some specialized courts have ridden
circuit in the past.228 The attendant inefficiencies can be avoided if the court
has enough business to justify permanent locations around the nation. To
avoid geographic inconsistencies in the law, it would then be necessary to
provide a mechanism for part or all of the full court to review decisions of
its local components.
229
Enrichment of the court's diet could be accomplished by reassigning some
jurisdiction that is presently vested in specialized fora. Elements could include
the Claims Court's nontax jurisdiction, 210 appeals from the International
226The Supreme Court has shown some concern about the fairness of narrow venue restric-
tions. In Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978), the Court softened a
requirement that certain EPA standards be challenged in the D.C. Circuit within a short
period, by allowing affected firms that had foregone appeal to litigate the issue whether the
standard in question was within the scope of the restriction. In passing, the Court remarked
that the "severity" of the scheme was accentuated because small firms could protect their
rights only by "daily perusal of ... the Federal Register and by immediate initiation of
litigation in the District of Columbia to protect their interests." Id. at 283 n.2.Justice Powell,
concurring, thought the restriction arguably raised a due process issue by its short deadline
and inadequate notice. Thus, attempts to centralize administrative review can raise the Court's
hackles. Even with efforts to provide adequate notice, inconvenience to private litigants could
be sufficient to impair review rights in some cases.
2"For the relatively few cases presenting issues of programmatic importance, placing appel-
late venue in the CAFC should not pose extreme inconvenience. These cases are likely to
attract support from interest groups, such as recipients' organizations.228Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 422 n.191.
229For a survey of available techniques, including limited en banc review, see Bruff, supra
note 90. See also H. DUBROFF, supra note 35, at 352-53 (summarizing a "conference system"
involving panel review of single-judge decisions, used by the Tax Court to promote uniformity).
2 OIn 1989, 717 complaints were filed in the Claims court, including 170 tax cases. Director
of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 1989 Annual Report [hereinafter
1989 AO RFPORT] at 370 (Table G-3a). In the same year, 112 appeals were filed in the
CAFC from the court. Id. at 369 (Table G-2).
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Trade Commission, 23' enforcement cases now decided by special split-
enforcement tribunals, 232 and appeals from the Merit Systems Protection
Board.23 3 Patent cases now found in district court could be transferred to
the Administrative Court to give it and the CAFC more complete control
over that subject matter.23 4 Also, Congress could reassign the portions of
immigration jurisdiction currently vested in district court.235 (Deportation
cases, currently mostly reviewed in circuit court, may involve sufficiently
important interests to deserve immediate resort to a constitutional court.)
Appeals from decisions of the National Labor Relations Board could be
shunted from the circuit courts.
2 36
Tax cases from the Claims Court, the Tax Court, and the district court
may deserve separate treatment. 237 The complexity of tax law and the breadth
of the issues it raises suggest the wisdom of a specialized court deciding only
tax cases. Still, the present Tax Court could be established as a separate
division of the Administrative Court, to exercise all initial review functions
in tax cases. 238 Appeals from this division would then go to the CAFC, as




To discharge its various responsibilities, the nontax division of the Admin-
istrative Court might need about twenty judges, a number comparable to
that of the Tax Court. Such a court could hear cases in the nation's cities,
as the Tax Court does. 240 Of course, it is difficult to predict necessary staff-
ing for a court not yet established. But one of the virtues of legislative courts
is that their number of judgeships can be adjusted with relative ease. As for
the CAFC, its present size of twelve might remain sufficient, or nearly so,
23 In 1990, there were 8 appeals from the ITC to the CAFC. 1990 AO REPORT (Table
A).
232In 1989, there were 12 FMS&HRC appeals in the circuit courts, and 11 OSHRC appeals.
1989 AO REPORT at 105 (Table S-i). Of course, these appeals represent a substantially larger
number of cases brought in those two fora.
2 331n 1989, there were 590 MSPB appeals to the CAFC. Id. at 369 (Table G-2). For 1990,
the figure was 687. 1990 AO REPORT (Table A).
234See supra note 29. To identify cases belonging in the new court, the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule that the CAFC uses to define its appellate jurisdiction could be employed.23'For surveys of judicial review in immigration law, see D. MARTIN, MAJOR ISSUES IN
IMMIGRATION LAW (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1987); Legomsky, supra note 77. In 1989, 285,424 peti-
tions for naturalization were filed in the district courts. AO REPORT at 127 ('Fable S-23).236
See R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 149 (suggesting specialized treatment of these cases). In
1989, there were 543 NLRB appeals filed in the circuit courts. 1989 AO REPORT at 105
(Table S-1).
23
-TUDY COMMITTEE REPORT supra note 2, at 69-71; Kramer, supra note 39, at 105.
2181n 1989, 170 tax cases were filed in Claims Court, 1989 AO REPORT at 370 (Table G-
3a); 2,555 were filed in district court, id. at 179 (Table C-2); 31,453 were filed in the Tax
Court, U.S. Tax Court, FY 1989 Annual Report.
23
91n 1989, there were 419 circuit court appeals from the Tax Court, 1989 AO REPORT
at 105 (Table S-l), and 310 from the district courts, id. at 141 (Table B-IA).240The nineteen judges of the Tax Court hear cases in about 80 cities.
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because some of its present cases would be shunted to the Administrative
Court, never to return.
24'
Whatever the final jurisdictional package chosen for an Administrative
Court, the opportunity exists to provide the federal courts relief from review
responsibilities that they are too overloaded to discharge well or happily,
242
and to improve the quality of both individual case disposition and overall
agency monitoring. Equally important, a centralized system for administra-
tive review can articulate uniform national law for the programs it considers.
24
1In 1989, the Circuit received 1,417 appeals, 590 of them from the MSPB. 1989 AO
REPORT at 369 (Table G-2). For 1990, the total was 1,466, with 687 of them from the MSPB.
1990 AO REPORT (Table A).
242Although creation of an Administrative Court would provide the federal courts some
docket relief, it would not contribute importantly to resolution of the current caseload crisis
there. All administrative cases comprised only 14% of the federal courts' cases in 1989. See
Bruff, supra note 90.
